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Abstract - Until 2006, the financial system prospered 
and was stable, and Basel II rules were viewed as 
contributing to that stability. The financial crisis of 
2007-2008 forced a change in those beliefs, as 
imbalances spread and risks materialized, affecting 
banks and other financial institutions, and impairing 
economic growth. We discuss the causes of the financial 
crisis, the response measures that were applied by 
governments, central banks and the changes in 
supervision and regulation that are being prepared 
under Basel III, to increase the resilience of banks, and 
to reduce the risks of future crisis. 
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1. The banking and financial system up 
to 2006 
A strong banking system, robust and stable, with 
banks at the center of the credit process and as the 
main engine of the economy, is a fundamental 
condition for sustainable economic growth, in which 
the probability of occurrence of shocks on the real 
economy is minimized.  
Until 2006, the dominant view was that financial 
systems were stable and resistant to adverse 
disturbances. The creditworthiness of counterparties 
to banks - firms and individuals - was considered 
high, and the macroeconomic and financial 
environment was favorable. Overall, the banking 
industry performed well, with increases in 
profitability and credit volumes registering low levels 
of impairment. The banks' total capital ratios 
remained comfortably above the regulatory minimum 
solvency ratio of 8%, even in the face of an increase 
in credit volumes.  
The prevailing model of financial intermediation 
– originate-to-distribute model – allowed banks to 
distribute the credit risks they accepted to other 
financial agents and institutional investors (e.g. 
through securitization transactions) and thus release 
capital (e.g. own funds previously established to 
cover those risks), which, in turn, could be channeled 
into strengthening credit activity. The buyers of the 
credit risks originated by banks were pension funds, 
insurance companies, investment funds, hedge funds, 
who took this opportunity to diversify their 
portfolios. 
The means available to ensure the security and 
stability of the financial systems provided comfort on 
the responsiveness to possible adverse events, 
including (i) guarantee funds deposits; (ii) protections 
for investors; (iii) regulators and supervisors; (iv) 
auditors and (v) the ability of central banks to grant 
loans. In this context, the implementation of the 
regulatory framework known as Basel II, represented 
a new form of supervision, with greater emphasis on 
the assessment and monitoring of risks, and allowed 
to predict the evolution of the risk management 
systems of banks in areas such as internal 
governance, technological solutions, and the 
widespread use of statistical tools in the estimation of 
risk in areas such as strategy, business and marketing. 
At the time, this was regarded as a significant step 
forward in the quality of supervision framework, and 
on the governance of banks, which was expected to 
become much more risk-aware and risk-oriented. 
Additionally, the continued prosperity and stability 
was proof that the system worked. 
2. The financial crisis of 2007-2008 
In 2007, the financial stability was significantly 
affected by a number of shocks originating in the 
North American subprime mortgage market, giving 
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severe episodes of recent economic history (see a 
detailed account by Acharya et al, 2009). In the 
financial stability report of the European Central 
Bank, issued in 2007, we can find a survey of the 
main causes of the crisis, including the following. 
At the macroeconomic level, the imbalances 
related to subprime credit affected the value of the 
portfolios of sovereign debt, particularly by way of 
inaccurate pricing of assets issued by certain 
countries (whose quality was lower than perceived), 
and a consequent contagion effect to third countries. 
Additionally, global imbalances resulting from 
persistently high deficits in the current accounts, led 
to capital flows from emerging countries to 
industrialized and rich economies, especially, the 
United States. 
The low level of interest rates potentiated strong 
credit growth in most industrialized economies (e.g. 
real estate credit, consumption and for investment in 
assets with potentially higher returns than bank 
deposits), which led to a rise in prices of assets and 
the distortion of the macroeconomic framework in a 
broad set of countries. Clear signs of these distortions 
were the significant increases of real estate 
construction, the consumption of durable goods 
(especially cars) and the increasing size of the 
financial sector. Another problem was the fact that 
agents presumed that bank funding markets would 
remain liquid, in any circumstance.  
At the microeconomic level, economic agents 
faced with various distortionary incentives. 
Individuals and firms maintained relationships with 
banks and investments made in firms (financial and 
non-financial) without getting properly informed 
about their financial situation. Managers of financial 
institutions contributed to the undercapitalization of 
institutions, via strong growth in financing by issuing 
bonds, with the aim of leveraging results, in order to 
increase the dividends payable to shareholders. 
Compensation schemes encouraged managers to 
make decisions neglecting the long term view, in 
favor of short-term objectives. Contracts for the 
transfer of credit risk were not structured in a way 
that ensured the right incentives, and that adequate 
resources were used, by the risk originating banks to 
continue to manage and control the underlying risks 
of credit activity, which potentiated the increase in 
defaults. The rating agencies attributed overly high 
ratings, in particular the bond issuers’ entities, 
inadvertently contributing for the increase of 
systemic risk. The auditors developed their activity 
subject to a conflict of interests with their customers, 
because they are paid by those they audit. 
Banks used inappropriate processes for 
monitoring and managing credit risk, using statistical 
tools based upon historical experience which, 
combined with a long period of relative stability, led 
to the perception that risk would be permanently low, 
thus under estimating it. This situation was 
compounded by the difficulty of estimating risk of 
new financial instruments to the extent that, with no 
historical data, these tools were not adequate to 
measure their risk. 
Banks tended to accept the ratings of rating 
agencies at the expense of their own effort to evaluate 
the risks incurred. The positions taken by banks in 
complex financial products, as well as the actual 
perimeter of the potential exposure (e.g., via the 
designated structured investment vehicles) were, in 
general, opaque, hindering the identification and 
valuation of risks assumed. The largest international 
banks took excessive leverage and allowed the 
gradual erosion of the quality level of their capital 
base. 
The matching of assets and liabilities showed a 
strong imbalance, with many banks holding 
insufficiently liquid assets. Additionally, some banks 
relied too much in wholesale funding markets in the 
very short term, in the incorrect assumption that it 
would always be possible to obtain liquidity in the 
markets.  
Financial institutions found ways to move their 
business out of the regulatory perimeter, surpassing 
the limitations on leverage resulting from regulatory 
capital requirements, increasing their risk level, with 
the primary purpose of increasing profits. The result 
of these imbalances was the breakdown of the largest 
and most liquid financial markets in the world, 
triggering a severe contraction in real economy. The 
moment widely accepted as marking the loss of 
confidence in the financial system was the 
bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers investment bank. 
While the tools of risk assessment and pricing, 
and the management systems of financial institutions, 
were able to keep up with the innovations of financial 
products, the originate-to-distribute model 
contributed positively to the stability of the financial 
system. However, the financial crisis revealed 
weaknesses that were not supposed to exist in banks, 
insurance firms, investment and pension funds 
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managing firms, and even governments, increasing 
the fear of a global system breakdown. 
The originate-to-distribute model itself 
contributed to the amplification of the effects of the 
crisis, facilitating wider risk transfer. The risks that 
large banking groups had transferred to others, 
sometimes unexpectedly returned to the origin, 
through a link of successive financial instruments. 
Also, the holding of volatile assets (e.g. most 
vulnerable to abrupt changes in the conditions of the 
capital markets) contributed to a risk liquidity 
exposure greater than perceived.  
Simultaneously, the financial turmoil affected 
the access to funding in wholesale markets, including 
money markets. The stress on liquidity gave rise to 
concerns about the credit quality of the portfolio and 
the adequacy of the capital levels. In turn, these 
concerns increased with the loss of investor 
confidence in the ability of certain financial 
institutions meeting their obligations.  
In credit, the retail segment showed high 
vulnerability to adverse disturbances, given the high 
leveraging and the rising of short term interest rates. 
In firms, credit ratings downgrades became more 
frequent than upgrades, even though there was no 
increase in the frequency of defaults. Asset prices in 
credit markets began to adjust, by widening spreads 
in the renewal of transactions. However, in general, 
banks made no significant changes in their credit 
policies, maintaining a growth trend, and thus 
averting any immediate effect on the real economy. 
3. Crisis response measures 
The scenario of crisis and turmoil in financial 
markets, coupled with strong fears of propagation to 
the global economy, in third quarter of 2008, led to a 
concerted action of governing bodies, including 
governments and supervisory authorities, which 
adopted unprecedented intervention measures, in an 
attempt to prevent blocking of financial innovation 
and a reduction of the system efficiency.  
The overall intervention by governments and 
central banks contributed to stop the negative effects 
of the interaction between the financial system and 
the economy, limiting the size of the economic 
downturn. This is critical, as systemic crises imply 
high costs, in terms of lost output, employment and 
fiscal costs (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). To this end, 
central banks implemented accommodative monetary 
policies, complemented with measures aimed at 
enabling the financial system to access liquidity and 
mitigating the disruptions in interbank money 
markets. Governments implemented fiscal and 
economic stimulus measures to support the financial 
system, with the goal of ensuring the stability of the 
latter and promoting the recovery of economic 
activity. 
The main measures were: (i) reduction of 
interest rates to near zero (monetary policy); (ii) 
expansion of the balance sheets of central banks; (iii) 
government aid packages; (iv) fiscal stimulus on 
aggregate demand; (v) support by the central bank to 
financing needs of banks (providing liquidity) and 
(vi) direct support to the governments of credit to 
firms and households (e.g., in the form of guarantees 
to banks).  
The commitment to avert the crisis, 
demonstrated by the implementation of successive 
measures, coupled with direct government support, 
calmed markets and prevented the collapse of the 
system, and several countries reached a more stable 
situation, by 2009, which continued in 2010. 
4. Responses at the regulatory level 
Prior to the beginning of the financial crisis, 
Basel II was seen as an important tool for 
strengthening risk management and prudential 
supervision, which would be conducted based on the 
perceived risk. Presumably, the conditions would be 
met to ensure that the banking systems in general and 
banks in particular, maintained a level of sustainable 
and adequate capital against the risk held.  
However, the triggering and worsening of the 
crisis exposed a number of vulnerabilities and 
weaknesses in the international financial system and 
its regulation, uncovering a set of behaviors of agents 
that resulted from a misalignment of incentives. 
Consequently, and despite the fact that the Basel II 
regulatory framework includes stress testing, and 
rules that should ensure that banks can assess the 
potential losses they may incur from unlikely but 
plausible scenarios, a general consensus on the need 
to improve some elements of Basel II emerged 
(Blinder, 2010 and Moosa, 2010).  
While in Basel I and II, the main focus was on 
the solvency capital, Basel III gives more focus to the 
problems too much leverage and inadequate buffers, 
by requiring different levels of reserves for different 
forms of bank deposits. The guidelines of Basel I and 
II were not abandoned, but are complemented with 
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new requirements, that aim to correct the problems 
and imbalances revealed by the financial crisis of 
2007-2008. 
Thus, the Capital Requirements Directive II and 
III were prepared for the purpose of reviewing and 
improving Basel II, and the development of a 
package of supplementary prudential measures, 
called Basel III, was initiated, focusing mainly on: (i) 
strengthening the quality of capital banks and their 
solvency ratios, (ii) reducing leverage in the financial 
system (iii) harmonization of liquidity requirements, 
both in the short and in the long run and (iv) the 
introduction of countercyclical macroprudential 
measures. Basel III will raise the minimum capital 
requirements, and banks will face higher capital 
charges for market risk, for exposures to off balance 
sheet vehicles and derivatives and for the credit risk 
of trading counterparties (see Chouinard and Paulin, 
2014).  
A new non risk based leverage ratio defined as 
tier 1 capital to total assets, with a maximum of 3%, 
will act as a safeguard against the modelling and 
measurement of risks, and will also constrain 
leverage to rise during economic booms, and 
subsequent reducing, during recessions. Two new 
liquidity standards will be introduced, assuring that 
banks have adequate liquidity sources over a 30 day 
period, and also that they use stable sources of 
funding over the long run. Additionally, Basel III 
introduces a countercyclical capital buffer with the 
aim of moderating the amplitude of credit cycles, and 
avoiding credit crunches to the real economy, during 
economic downturns. These revisions and new 
measures will be phased in over the period 2013-
2019.  
Additionally, a consensus emerged that 
supervision and regulation should be improved and 
more centralized, with more specific rules, promoting 
best practices in risk management and internal 
governance, and correcting the misaligned incentives. 
Basel III imposes that, among other measures all 
banks must conduct much more rigorous analysis of 
the risk inherent in certain securities such as complex 
debt packages, and that banks implement much more 
complete disclosures than before the crisis, including 
their exposure to off-balance sheet vehicles, how they 
are reported in the accounts, and how banks calculate 
their capital ratios under the new regulations. 
Some professionals worry that the rules of Basel 
III are too stringent, and may have gone too far, and 
that there is a real danger that reform will limit the 
availability of credit and reduce economic activity. 
Allen et al. (2012) claim that the problem is not 
higher capital and liquidity requirements per se but 
rather the difficulties of ensuring a coordinated 
adaption to the new rules across the entire financial 
services industry. The supervisory authorities will 
have to work together, to ensure an harmonized 
implementation, while correcting and adapting the 
new rules, in case they do not perform as intended or 
if they do not promote the desired effects. But what 
the financial crisis of 2007-2008 showed us all, is that 
we do need different rules to promote financial 
stability, than those we had under Basel II. 
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